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It is generally held that rural Australians are more cooperative in character than their 
urban counterparts. To explore one aspect of this notion, we conducted an 
experiment which compared trust and trustworthiness among a sample of Australian 
senior high school students which included students with both pastoral and non-
pastoral backgrounds. While student behaviour is unlikely to mimic adult behaviour, 
any significant differences between pastoral and non-pastoral students would 
suggest differences do exist between the social norms that guide pastoral and non-
pastoral communities. We repeated our experiment at three different schools 
containing students from both pastoral and non-pastoral backgrounds, allowing us to 
draw comparisons. In total 78 students participated. Our experiments were based on 
similar experiments that have been applied across a range of contexts internationally 
(trust game/investment game). We did not find evidence of differences between 
students with pastoral and non-pastoral backgrounds, either in the level of trust in 
others or in trustworthiness, though our methods probably have a bias towards this 
conclusion. Our results concurred with other studies in showing that social distance 
is an important determinant of the level of cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some degree of trust is necessary for almost any economic interaction to occur, as 
most contracts are incomplete to some degree. The exact value of trust varies 
according to context. In rangelands, the high uncertainty in resource distribution 
means that the spatial social links and trust among pastoralists are of very high 
value. Testimony to this is the persistence of long standing institutions which foster 
trust and cooperation in order to share rangeland resources. For example, Bedouin 
pastoralists have established a system of reciprocal altruism such that when forage 
is locally sufficient but scarce elsewhere, access is given to others on the 
understanding that the outsiders will allow reciprocal access when circumstances are 
reversed (Perevolotsky, 1987). In southern Zimbabwe and northern Cameroon, 
pastoralists have a cattle ‘loaning system’ and transhumance, often established 
through kin networks (Scoones, 1992). Our focus is on Australian rangelands where, 
even though governance is more formal than in African rangeland systems, informal 
institutions and trust are still central to the system’s function. The commercial but 
largely trust-based agistment networks provide some evidence of this (McAllister et 
al., 2006; Reeson et al.). 
The importance of such trust-based networks in rangelands poses some 
interesting questions. Does resource uncertainty foster a culture of trust, or more 
specifically in terms of the Australian context, do individuals in rangelands develop 
different views on governance (Brown et al., 2006) and more trusting mental models 
than their non-pastoral contemporaries? Is trust related only to ingrained social 
norms, or does the degree of ‘social distance’ matter (ie. kinship, geographic region 
and so forth)? In the Australian context, these questions are complicated by a history 
of government propaganda which sought to tame and popularise the trustworthiness An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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of rural Australians, such that the government’s custodianship over the new nation 
could be legitimised (Day, 2001; Quinn, 2001). Indeed the popular perception that 
rural communities are more cooperative than urban communities is quite possibly a 
legacy of this campaign, and may be wrong (Gill, 2005). 
In this paper, we begin to empirically explore the issue of any urban/rural 
divide through the application of techniques from experimental economics. 
Experiments provide an opportunity to empirically measure trust and trustworthiness 
within an experimental setting. A well-studied experimental scenario is the 
investment game (Berg et al., 1995, also called the trust game), in which two 
subjects are faced with a situation where trust is required to maximise their payoffs. 
One player (the proposer) is given a sum of money (typically $10), and has the 
opportunity to pass any amount of this initial sum to the second player (the 
responder). The amount the proposer transfers is multiplied by three before being 
handed to the responder. The responder then has an opportunity to give any amount 
of this money back to the proposer. If the proposer transfers the entire amount (eg. 
$10), the responder receives $30, which maximises the total payoff. If the responder 
chooses to return more than the amount sent, then both will have more money than 
they started with.  
In the investment game, the responder has no incentive to return any amount 
back to the proposer (particularly in a single, anonymous interaction). Knowing this, 
the proposer may not pass anything on in the first place, and all potential gains will 
be lost. Trust provides a way out of this dilemma. If the proposer is trusting, they will 
pass the full amount to the responder. If the responder is trustworthy, they will return 
more than the initial endowment back to the proposer. By trusting the responder, the 
proposer can benefit if the responder cooperates, but may end up with nothing if the R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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responder is non-cooperative. This has analogies with many real life situations in 
which some degree of trust is required for two parties to complete a mutually 
beneficial exchange. 
Game theory suggests that in such a situation a rational, self-interested agent 
will be neither trusting nor trustworthy, and so will transfer nothing. However, results 
of experiments show that people are generally more cooperative than this – typically 
proposers send around half of their endowment to the responder, and responders 
send back around half the amount they receive (eg. Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and List, 
2004). However there is a broad range of responses, with proposers sending from 0-
100%, and responders returning 0-70% (Berg et al., 1995). Individuals, through their 
unique set of experiences, develop cultural and social norms which they tend to 
apply to their day-to-day decision making processes, presumably to get the most 
benefit over the temporal scale that is most important to them.  
In this paper we test for differences between how people from pastoral and 
non-pastoral backgrounds play an investment game. Our experimental subjects were 
students from senior high schools. While there are good practical reasons for 
focussing on students in such experiments, it does limit our ability to extrapolate our 
results to the broader community. The nature of being in school together means that 
students are likely to share many behavioural traits, regardless of their backgrounds. 
This means that the absence of any observed differences among students cannot 
rule out differences among adult communities. However, if there are significant 
differences between students from pastoral and non-pastoral backgrounds, this 
would suggest that differences do exist between the social norms that guide pastoral 
and non-pastoral communities. This study therefore represents a first step in An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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applying experiments to empirically test for such differences. Specifically, we test two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis One: Students from the pastoral districts are more trusting and more 
trustworthy than their non-pastoral based contemporaries. 
Hypothesis Two: Trust decreases with social distance in both non-pastoral and 
pastoral-rural students. 
METHODS 
Versions of the investment game have been used to experimentally measure trust 
among various groups of subjects (eg. Fehr and Falk, 2002; Eckel and Wilson, 2004; 
Gächter et al., 2004; Fehr and List, 2004). Experiments have the advantage that they 
can be used to observe real economic decisions under controlled conditions. 
Economic experiments use real money, so they confront subjects with real 
incentives, and so collect data based on real decisions rather than hypothetical 
survey responses. Experimental subjects make decisions according to the situation 
and incentives they are presented with in the laboratory setting. However they bring 
with them the social norms and mental models that they use in day-to-day life. By 
presenting subjects from different backgrounds with an identical decision making 
environment, it is possible to determine whether they are using different mental 
models or social norms to arrive at their decisions.  
Experimental Design 
The experiment involved recruiting 26 students, whom we allocated randomly into 
one of two groups in separate rooms. Each student in Group A (the proposers) was 
anonymously paired with a student in Group B (the responders). Those in Group A 
were given $10 and then had the opportunity to send some, all or none of that 
money to their anonymous partner in Group B. Whatever money was sent was R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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tripled. For example, if the student in Group A sent $10, the student in Group B 
received $30. If the student in Group A sent $5, the student in Group B received $15. 
If the student in Group A sent nothing, the student in Group B received no money. 
The students in Group B were then given the opportunity to send some, all, or none 
of the money they received back to their anonymous partner in Group A.  
Supplementary Survey 
We conducted a supplementary survey to provide both demographic data and 
additional behavioural information. The supplementary data sought to examine how 
participants would behave if they were playing the same experiment with persons of 
a known social distance. Using this approach Buchan and Croson (2004) presented 
questions relating to how one may behave in an order that seemed to pre-empt 
responses: ie. in the order of decreasing social distance. Concerned that this may 
bias the results, we presented our questions in three different orders. (1) first, we 
attempted to pre-empt the order as decreasing social distance; (2) second we used 
an order that was randomly defined; and (3) third, we used an alternatively 
randomised order, which we only used on six students as a means of double-
checking our results (Table 1). The survey also had a number of questions designed 
to establish how closely the student was associated with pastoral communities. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Sampling Selection 
We conducted the experiment at three different schools, all in different regions; 
Townsville in northern Queensland, Alice Springs in central Australia (Northern 
Territory), and Toowoomba in south-east Queensland. In each school we ran the 
experiment just once. In selecting the schools, we only considered those that taught An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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both male and female students and had both boarding and non-boarding students. 
All such schools were private (fee paying). We only considered schools where we 
had established that they had some students from pastoral properties. In all we 
contacted six schools, but three schools were not willing to allow their students to 
participate. 
We asked each participating school to select 26 students from years 10 to 12. 
We were required to be very flexible in allowing the schools to select which students 
could participate, and as a result each school selected their 26 students based on 
different reasons. The three sub-samples where: (1) a combination of a biological 
sciences and a mathematics class; (2) boarding students who volunteered; and (3) a 
geography class. Because our schools selected their sub-samples differently, we 
tested for differences between schools (and found none, below). In our sample of 78, 
we captured 26 students from pastoral backgrounds (Table 2). We categorised 
people as pastoral (or non-pastoral) based on the demographic question “Does your 
family run a grazing enterprise?” (Boxes 3 and 4, end of paper). Results from other 
demographic questions confirmed that this categorisation was robust. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was run in a consistent manner in each school. All participants were 
explained the full set of rules before the experiment began. Participants were 
provided with written instructions (Box 1, end of paper). They were asked to read 
these, and the instructions were then read aloud to ensure that everyone understood 
the procedure. Instructions used ‘neutral’ language – emotive terms such as trust 
were not used. The instructions we gave the students were honest and in no way 
misleading, and we did not elaborate on our motivations until after each experiment R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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was complete. Each student was given a card which allocated them a unique 
number. We used the number to assign people into two groups (A and B) and to 
assign each student in Group A to a partner in Group B. We repeatedly assured 
participants that all decisions, results and pairing of people were anonymous – they 
would never know who their partner was. 
Group B left the room, while Group A where given a form such that they could 
pass between 0 and $10 (whole numbers only) to their anonymous partner (Box 2, 
top section of form, end of paper). When we collected their form, we gave them the 
supplementary survey asking them what decisions they would have made if they had 
been playing the game with partners from a range of social distances, and what they 
would expect to receive back from those people (Box 3, end of paper). 
Once all forms where collected, Group A was dismissed and Group B re-
entered the room. People in Group B were presented with a form with the top section 
completed by their anonymous partner (these were duplicate forms filled in by the 
researchers to avoid the possibility of identifying handwriting). They then completed 
the bottom part of the form (Box 2, end of paper), indicating how much they opted to 
return to their partner (of course those who had received nothing from their partner 
did not have the option to send anything back). After completing the form, they were 
also given the survey, which asked them what they would expect to receive from, 
and how much they would return to, a range of hypothetical partners from different 
social distances (Box 4, end of paper). An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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RESULTS 
Pastoral and Non-Pastoral Trust Levels 
Our first hypothesis was that high school students from pastoral backgrounds used 
mental models that were fundamentally more trusting in nature than their non-
pastoral counterparts (Hypothesis One, above). Participants were categorised into 
those with and without pastoral backgrounds, based on the first demographic 
question in our questionnaire (Boxes 3 and 4, end of paper). The variable tested was 
the percentage of the amount received that was sent to the person’s pair. For Group 
A, this is the amount sent to their Group B pair as a percentage of $10. For Group B 
this is the amount sent to their Group A pair as a percentage of how much they 
received from their Group A pair. We deleted any rows of data with missing 
information. On average, participants in Group A sent 54.4% of their $10, while those 
in Group B returned 28.2% (Table 3). ANOVA analysis showed no statistical 
difference in the actions of non-pastoral and pastoral students for either Group A or 
Group B (Table 4). When we increased the number of explanatory categories to 
include sex, and school (as well as pastoral background), we also found no 
differences between the actions of pastoral and non-pastoral students for both Group 
A and B. Further there were no differences between schools. In Group B, there was 
a difference between the actions of male and female students, with female students 
returning significantly more than their male counterparts. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The decisions of different groups of students can also be viewed graphically. 
In Figure 1 we compare pastoral and non-pastoral, male and female, and the three R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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different schools which participated in the study. We cannot compare across Groups 
A and B as they were facing quite different decisions. The only statistical difference 
shown in the figures is that between male and female students in Group B (Figure 
1c).  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Social Distance 
Our second hypothesis related to how trust in students varies depending on social 
distance (Hypothesis Two, above), which was tested using the supplementary 
survey data on hypothetical decisions with partners at various social distances. Our 
results showed for both Groups A and B that trust decreases with social distance 
(Figure 2). Social distance is a statistically significant descriptor of behavioural 
differences. The order in which the students were presented with the questions does 
not appear to have a significant effect. Likewise we found no differences between 
the responses of those with and without a pastoral background. Our results also 
allow us to examine differences between expectations of receiving and sending. We 
found that what students expect to send is consistent with what others would expect 
to receive in the same social context (Figure 3). 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We also tested for differences between how pastoral and non-pastoral 
students completed the survey. We found no significant differences. However, for the 
four categories of social distance we deemed closest (close relative, cousin, 
classmate, schoolmate), pastoral students expected to send less and receive more 
(Figure 4), while students from pastoral backgrounding consistently expected to An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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receive and send more with ‘someone in the area where they live’ (Figure 4). Where 
someone lives is a highly generalised statement, so the implication of this result is 
constrained to highlighting an aspect of rural trust that could be explored further. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of our research was to test for differences between high schools students 
with pastoral backgrounds and those without in terms of their propensity to 
cooperate. Our experimental approach allowed us to gather empirical data on how 
much students trust others and how trustworthy they are. In our experiment, trust 
was measured by how much money students sent to their anonymous partner, and 
trustworthiness was measured by how much money those people returned. 
  In Australia, there is a popular perception that rural Australians are more 
genuine in character and more trusting than their urban counterparts. The 
presumption of our study was if there were differences in the behaviour of students 
from pastoral and non-pastoral backgrounds, this will reflect difference in the broader 
populations. Our simple, context-free experiment found no support for differences in 
trust and trustworthiness between students with and without pastoral backgrounds. 
Of course such simple experiments will not always detect differences in social 
norms, even where they do exist, even though similar experiments have been used 
to document social and cultural differences across a range of groups (Henrich et al., 
2001).  
  In our case it is possible that any pastoral/non-pastoral differences were 
masked by other factors, and there is some empirical analysis of these (Leigh, 
2006). Our experiments were run with school students, whose mental models may R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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not have developed to the same extent as adults in their communities. There is 
evidence that trusting and trustworthy behaviour, as observed in these experiments, 
is broadly comparable in children and adults, although results from experiments with 
children tend to be more variable (Harbaugh et al., 2003). However, age does have 
an impact, with trust being higher among adults than teenagers, and among 
teenagers than in children aged below 10 (Harbaugh et al., 2003; Sutter and Kocher 
in press). Within the age group we targeted in this study (15-17 years), age 
differences have little effect on trust (Harbaugh et al., 2003). 
  Behaviour will also be impacted by a great many other factors other than 
belonging to pastoral or non-pastoral communities. The fact that our participants 
attended the same schools may be enough to mask any differences related to 
pastoralism. Finally, rural rangeland communities are becoming increasingly 
connected to more urbanised centres through communications technology (Ash and 
Stafford Smith, 2003). The new generation of pastoralists who participated in our 
study may have lacked the isolation, which in theory fosters high levels of 
cooperation (Maru et al., 2007). 
  There were some gender differences apparent in our results.  While male and 
female proposers transferred similar amounts, female responders returned 
significantly more than males. This is in accordance with previous findings, and 
suggests that females may be more motivated to reciprocate positive actions than 
males (Croson and Buchan, 1999; Fabiansson, 2006).  
  Our results also support previous findings that trust and trustworthiness 
decrease with social distance (Buchan and Croson, 2004). People tend to trust close 
family members most. In the rangeland context this has implications because it 
implies that networks are likely to be aligned to kin. Further, if social distance is An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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important and negatively related to cooperation, then our results imply that networks 
will be strongest in local areas. In rangelands where networks can be used to buffer 
resource variation over very large distances, it seems likely that people will need to 
liaise in a part of their network where they may neither trust others nor be 
trustworthy. 
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Figure 1.   
 
Behavioural differences between (a) pastoral and non-pastoral (b) male and female, 
and (c) inter-school categories. Behaviour is the ratio of what a participant sent to 
what they received. The dots show mean behaviour while vertical lines show 95% 
confidence intervals. (Note that all confidence internals reported in this paper are 



















Group A Group B


















Group A Group B


















Group A Group B
s1 s2 s3 s1 s2 s3
 An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
16 
Figure 2.   
 
Behaviour and social distance for alternate question orders: linear order (solid line) 
and random order (dashed line), with bars representing 95% C.I. of the difference 
between lines (bootstrap method), and x-axis social distance in the order of 
questions (Boxes 3 and 4): (a) Group B would send to Group A, (b) Group A expects 
to receive from Group B, (c) Group A would send to Group B, (d) Group B expects to 
receive from Group A (before tripling). Note, the alternate random order (Table 1) 







































































































Expectations of sending and receiving, and social distance (with bars representing 
95% C.I. of the difference between lines).  (a) what Group B would expect to send to 
Group A (dashed line) and what Group A expects to receive from those in Group B 
(solid line). (b) what Group B expects to receive from those in Group A (dotted line, 
before tripling) what Group A expects to send from those in Group B (solid line). The 
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Figure 4.  
 
Behaviour and social distance for pastoral and non-pastoral students: pastoral (solid 
line) and non-pastoral (dashed line), with bars representing 95% C.I. of the 
difference between lines, and x-axis social distance in the order of questions (Boxes 
3 and 4): (a) Group B would send to Group A, (b) Group A expects to receive from 
Group B, (c) Group A would send to Group B, (d) Group B expects to receive from 
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Table 1.  Three different orderings of social distance questions presented in 













A close relative (eg brother, sister, parent) 
A cousin (or similar relative) 
Someone from your class 
Someone from another class in your school 
Someone from the area where you live 
Someone from a diff. area within your region 
Someone from Sydney 



















































Table 2.   Basic sample data 
 
      School   Total 
       1    2    3   
%  of  female  students    50% 46% 46%     47% 
% with pastoral background  27%  56%  20%      34% 
Number  of  participants   26 26 26     78 An Experimental Approach to Comparing Trust in Pastoral and Non-pastoral Australia 
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Table 3.  Summary of results: mean behaviour with standard deviations in brackets 
 
 
a.   Group A 
    Non-pastoral   Pastoral 
Received         $10 (0)    $10 (0) 
Sent     $5.43  (3.04)   $5.45  (2.94) 
Sent/received, %    54.3% (30.4)   54.5% (29.4) 
Number  in  category   28    11 
Normality
A    No  (p=0.006)   No  (p=0.014) 
 
 
b.   Group B 
    Non-pastoral   Pastoral 
Received          $18.41  (8.75)   $15.92  (6.17)     
Returned    $5.59  (5.42)   $5.45  (4.77) 
Returned/received, %  27.3% (22.9)   29.6% (21.7)    
Number  in  category   22    13 
Normality
A       Yes (p= 0.094)  No (p=0.0159)   
 
 
A  Normality is tested using the Lillilifors test for small samples. The null hypothesis is that 
the data are from a family of normally distributed curves. At 5 percent significance, p>0.05 
indicates that the normality hypothesis be rejected. Note that only non-pastoral Group B data 
are normally distributed. For this reason, non-paramatric ANOVA were considered, but these 
did not change the results reported in Table 4, and non-parameter metric confidence 
intervals are used throughout the paper. R.R.J. McAllister and A.F. Reeson 
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Table 4.  ANOVA results  
 
(a-b) analysis of the role of our pastoral background variable. (c-d) analysis the role 
of three variables: pastoral background; sex; and school.  
 
 
a. One-way ANOVA, Group A, Pastoral Vs. non-pastoral background 
Source   SS     df   MS     F   Prob>F  
Groups   0.00005   1   0.00005   0   0.9808  
Error     3.35584   37   0.0907  
Total     3.3559   38  
 
 
b. One-way ANOVA, Group B, A Pastoral Vs. non-pastoral background 
Source   SS     df   MS     F   Prob>F  
Groups   0.00441   1   0.00441   0.09   0.7696  
Error     1.66996   33   0.0506  
Total     1.67438   34 
 
 
c. 3-way ANOVA, Group A 
Source   Sum Sq.   d.f.   Mean Sq.   F   Prob>F  
School  0.26373   2   0.13186   1.29   0.2909  
Sex    0.00151   1   0.00151   0.01   0.9041  
Pastoral  0.09485   1   0.09485   0.93   0.3436  
School*Sex  0.0929   2   0.04645   0.45   0.6395  
School*Past. 0.03883   2   0.01942   0.19   0.8281  
Sex*Pastoral 0.14359   1   0.14359   1.4   0.2457  
Error     2.96678   29   0.1023  
Total     3.3559   38  
 
 
d. 3-way ANOVA, Group B 
Source   Sum Sq.   d.f.   Mean Sq.   F   Prob>F  
School  0.1522   2   0.07610   1.98   0.1594  
Sex     0.24489   1   0.24489   6.37   0.0184  
Pastoral   0.02195   1   0.02195   0.57   0.4571  
School*Sex   0.08143   2   0.04071   1.06   0.3620  
School*Past.  0.07084   2   0.03542   0.92   0.4113  
Sex*Pastoral  0.01977   1   0.01977   0.51   0.4800  
Error     0.96168   25   0.03847  
Total     1.67438   34 





You have been asked to take part in a scientific experiment. This is part of a 
CSIRO research program looking at how people make decisions within 
various social contexts. Taking part is voluntary. The decisions you make in 
the experiment are completely confidential – no one else in the school will be 
able to know what you decided. 
You will be allocated at random into two groups, which will go to different 
rooms. Each person in Room A will be paired with a person in Room B, but 
this experiment is anonymous – in other words you will never know who you 
were paired with.  
Those in Room A begin with $10. They have the opportunity to send some, 
all, or none of that money to an anonymous partner in Room B. Whatever 
money they send will be tripled. For example, if the person in Room A sends 
$10, the person in Room B will receive $30. If the person in Room A sends 
$5, the person in Room B will receive $15. If the person in Room A sends 
nothing, the person in Room B will receive no money. 
A person in Room B will receive three times the amount of money that their 
‘partner’ in Room A sent to them. They then will be given the opportunity to 
send some, all or none of that money back to the original sender in Room A.  
Please fill in your decisions on the sheets provided. These decisions 
represent real money, which we will pay to you after the experiment.  
Examples: 
(1)  Andrew, in Room A, is given the $10. He decides to send $5 to his 
‘partner’ in Room B. He does not know who his ‘partner’ is. The $5 sent by 
Andrew is tripled to $15. Brian, in Room B, receives the $15. Brian also does 
not know who his ‘partner’ is. Brian decides to return $7 to his ‘partner’ in 
Room A. Therefore, Andrew now has $12 (the $5 he originally kept plus the 
$7 transferred to him by Brian) and Brian now has $8 (the $15 from Andrew, 
minus the $7 he returned). 
(2)  Anthea, in Room A, is given the $10 and decides to send all $10 to her 
anonymous partner (in this case Belinda in Room B). Belinda therefore 
receives $30 (3 x $10). Belinda chooses to return half the money, so both 
Anthea and Belinda finish with $15. 
(3)  Adele, in Room A, is given the $10. She decides to send nothing to her 
partner in Room B. Her partner Brendan, in Room B, receives no money. As 
Brendan has not received any money, he cannot send any back to Adele. 
Adele therefore finishes with $10, while Brendan gets no money. 
In addition to what you receive through the above process, each person 
will receive an extra $5 for taking part. 
Thank you for taking part in this study. 







You are playing the role of Player A. You have $10. You may transfer some, 
all or none of this amount to your anonymous partner. Any amount you 
transfer will be tripled. Your partner will then have the opportunity to transfer 
some, all or none of this money back to you. 
Please mark only one box with a cross, indicating your decision 
￿   $0   (tripled value $0)   
￿   $1  (tripled value $3) 
￿   $2  (tripled value $6) 
￿   $3  (tripled value $9) 
￿   $4  (tripled value $12) 
￿   $5  (tripled value $15) 
￿   $6  (tripled value $18) 
￿   $7  (tripled value $21) 
￿   $8  (tripled value $24) 
￿   $9  (tripled value $27) 
￿   $10  (tripled value $30) 
 
Group B 
You are playing the role of Player B. Above you can see how much your 
anonymous partner has transferred to you (indicated by the tripled value). You 
are now given the opportunity to send some, all or none of that money back to 
the original sender in Room A. 
Your anonymous partner will not see this form. 
How much would you like to return to your anonymous partner: 
$________________ 






Imagine you were doing this experiment with a number of different partners. 
Please say how much of the $10 you would send to your partner (answer in 
dollars, between $0 and 10), and how much you would expect them to send 
back to you, remembering that what you send them is tripled in value (answer 




A close relative (eg brother, sister, parent) 
A cousin (or similar relative)     
Someone from your class     
Someone from another class in your school 
Someone from the area where you live 
Someone from a different area within your 
region 
Someone from Sydney 























Demographic questions (please circle one answer):- 
Does your family run a grazing enterprise? 
yes   no 
Does your family make their living from a grazing enterprise? 
none   some   most   all 
During school holidays, do you live on a grazing enterprise? 
never   occasionally   mostly   always 
Do one or both of your parents work on a grazing enterprise? 
never   occasionally   mostly   always 
How long have you been at this school?          (years) 
During school holidays, how much time do you spend in town (eg Brisbane, 
Toowoomba, Alice Springs, Townsville)? 
none   a  little     some   most   all 
How many older brothers and sisters do you have?       ____       





Imagine you were doing this experiment with a number of different partners. 
Please say how much you would expect to receive from your partner 
remembering that the amount they sent is tripled (answer in dollars, 
between $0 and 30), and how much you would send back to them (answer in 
dollars, between $0 and 30), if your partner was:- 
 
 
A close relative (eg brother, sister, parent) 
A cousin (or similar relative)     
Someone from your class     
Someone from another class in your school 
Someone from the area where you live 
Someone from a different area within your 
region 
Someone from Sydney 























Demographic questions (please circle one answer):- 
Does your family run a grazing enterprise? 
yes   no 
Does your family make their living from a grazing enterprise? 
none   some   most   all 
During school holidays, do you live on a grazing enterprise? 
never   occasionally   mostly   always 
Do one or both of your parents work on a grazing enterprise? 
never   occasionally   mostly   always 
How long have you been at this school?       (years) 
During school holidays, how much time do you spend in town (eg Brisbane, 
Toowoomba, Alice Springs, Townsville)? 
none   a  little     some   most   all 
How many older brothers and sisters do you have?       
How many younger brothers and sisters do you have?       
 